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Summary and highlights
The aim of this paper is to restate the case for social democracy and to propose a 
policy  agenda  in  response  to  the  global  financial  crisis.  The  crisis  is  not  a 
temporary aberration, to be followed by a return to the ‘normality’ of the late 
20th  century,  dominated  by  the  ideology  of  economic  liberalism.  Rather  the 
economic and social system that emerges from the global financial crisis will be 
radically transformed. Social democrats face both new opportunities for reform, 
and new challenges and constraints resulting from the collapse of the economic 
order of the last three decades.
*  Social democrats have long stressed the argument that we have the capacity 
to share and manage risks more effectively as a society than as individuals. In 
the  light  of  the  financial  crisis,  only  social  democratic  policies  can  provide 
individuals and families with security to manage the risk and uncertainty of a 
market economy
* The global financial crisis represents a failure of both the policies of financial 
deregulation pursued since the 1970s and of its primary theoretical justification, 
the efficient markets hypothesis.
* A reconstructed financial sector must be based on a tightly controlled system 
of  ‘narrow  banking’  providing  essential  financial  services  to  households  and 
business. Banking must be clearly separated from speculative financial activity. 
Speculative financial enterprises must bear the full risk associated with their 
activities, without any public guarantee or support.
* The inevitable contraction of the financial sector creates both the need and the 
opportunity for an expansion in the provision of non-financial human services, 
such as health and education.
* The financial crisis has undermined the case for the privatisation of public 
infrastructure  and  implies  an  end  to  ‘innovative’  financing  methods  such  as 
public-private partnerships
* The failure of economic liberalism does not imply a wholesale return to the 
ideas and policies of the postwar social democratic era. Social democrats must 
learn from the mistakes of that era and retain what was valuable in economic 
liberalism,  including  a  commitment  to  sound  fiscal  policy  and  a  rejection  of 
protectionist restrictions on trade in goods and services.2
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An agenda for social democracy
After decades of frequently dispiriting defensive struggles, social democrats find 
themselves faced with unexpected opportunities and problems arising from the 
unexpected collapse of their principal adversaries. 
The global financial sector, which had long overawed national governments with 
threats of ratings downgrades and capital flight, and dazzled the world with the 
immense wealth it generated, has suddenly become a collection of desperate and 
widely-despised mendicants, bailed out at the expense of ordinary citizens.
1
The  ideology  of  economic  liberalism
2,  based  on  the  supposed  efficiency  and 
optimality  of  capital  markets,  has  proved  unable  to  generate  a  coherent 
response to a crisis its advocates failed to predict or to recognise until it was far 
too  late.  As  Kevin  Rudd  recently  observed  in  The  Monthly,  social  democrats 
have been left, as in the wake of previous market failures, to clean up the mess 
(Rudd 2009). While critics such as Costa (2009) have pointed to a range of real 
or perceived inconsistencies in Rudd’s argument, no coherent alternative to the 
government’s interventionist response has been offered.
Thus  far,  however,  social  democrats  have  focused  almost  exclusively  on 
managing the immediate financial and macroeconomic crisis. The problems of 
stabilising  national  and  international  banking  systems,  and  of  providing  the 
most  effective  possible  stimulus  to  the  economy  at  both  national  and  global 
levels are both difficult and important. It is already evident, however, that this 
crisis  is  not  a  temporary  aberration.  Its  resolution  will  not  be  followed  by  a 
return  to  the  ‘normality’  of  the  late  20th  century.  The  economic  and  social 
1 Unsurprisingly perhaps, dependence on the public purse has barely dented the massive flow of 
salaries, bonuses, options and perks which, we are told, is necessary if the sector is to keep on 
delivering the results it has produced so far. 
2 A variety of terms including ‘neoliberalism’, ‘Thatcherism’ and the ‘Washington Consensus’ 
have been used to describe the ideological viewpoint, characterized by advocacy of privatization 
and free-market economic policies, that was dominant from the 1970s until recently.  Because 




system  that  emerges  from  the  global  financial  crisis  will  be  radically 
transformed, and the policy decisions made in the course of the crisis will help 
to determine the nature of that transformation.
It is important, therefore, to consider how the financial crisis has changed the 
range of possibilities open to us. Social democrats in particular, face both new 
opportunities for reform, and new challenges and constraints resulting from the 
collapse of the economic order of the last three decades. The aim of this paper is 
to  restate  the  case  for  social  democracy  and  to  propose  a  policy  agenda  in 
response to the global financial crisis.
1. The new case for social democracy 
The  resilience  of  social  democratic  institutions  and  values  in  the  face  of  a 
concerted attack from advocates of free-market reform has been striking. The 
time is now ripe for a shift from the defensive position of the last thirty years, in 
which  social  democrats  struggled  mainly  to  protect  the  achievements  of  the 
past.  In the circumstances of the global financial crisis, the most natural way to 
restate the case for social democracy is in terms of risk and insecurity, as in 
Quiggin (2007).
Governments of all political persuasions are being forced to deal with a sudden 
and  drastic  increase  in  risk  and  insecurity  generated  by  the  collapse  of  the 
global  financial  sector.  But  only  a  social  democratic  analysis  provides  any 
coherent basis for a response.
The alternative, economic liberal, vision of a society in which the problems of 
risk, insecurity and public good provision are dealt with by a combination of 
markets  and  contracts  has  proved  unsustainable.  Financial  markets,  which 
were supposed to supplant the social democratic state, are now calling on that 
same state for protection. Bankruptcy, the first state intervention to deal with 4
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failed contracts, is now being called upon on an unprecedented scale, and many 
other rescue measures are needed.
Social democrats have long stressed the argument that we have the capacity to 
share and manage risks more effectively as a society than as individuals. The 
set of policies traditionally associated with social democracy may be regarded as 
responses to a range of risks facing individuals, from health risks to uncertain 
life chances.
Risk and inequality are closely linked. On the one hand, the greater the risks 
faced by individuals in the course of their life, including the risk associated with 
differences in initial opportunities, the more unequal society is likely to be. On 
the other hand, as the financial crisis has shown, radical inequality in outcomes, 
such as that associated with massive rewards to financial traders, encourages a 
search for opportunities to capture the benefits of risky actions while shifting 
the costs of such actions onto others, or onto society as a whole.
A social democratic response to the crisis must begin by reasserting the crucial 
role  of  the  state  in  risk  management.  If  individuals  are  to  have  security  of 
employment,  income  and  wealth,  governments  must  establish  the  necessary 
legal and economic framework and enforce its rules. The fact that government is 
the ultimate risk manager both justifies and necessitates action to mitigate the 
grotesque  inequalities  in  both  opportunities  and  outcomes  that  characterise 
unrestrained capitalism and were increasingly resurgent in the era of economic 
liberalism.
The interpretation of social democratic as a collective social response to risk and 
uncertainty may be illustrated by considering some of the core functions of the 
welfare state, such as health care and education. 
The  necessity  of  public  financing  may  be  traced  to  the  risks  associated  with 
health in both the short term and long term. In the short term, we can't know 
for sure if or when we will get sick. In the long term, markets cannot manage 5
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the risk associated with the fact that some people will have chronically worse 
health than others. 
The  problems  with  market  provision  of  health  care  are  well  known.  In  the 
absence  of  public  intervention  or  insurance,  health  care  expenses  for  even 
moderately serious illnesses and injuries are so large and uncertain as to be 
beyond  the  capacity  of  most  individuals  and  households  to  manage  through 
ordinary  methods  such  as  drawing  on  savings.  In  the  United  States,  for 
example, an average day in hospital can cost $US1,500 (around $AUD2,000). 
Even a short stay in hospital can exhaust the liquid financial resources of the 
average household. 
These  problems  have  been  exacerbated  by  the  financial  crisis,  which  has 
brought the US system of employer-provided health insurance to the brink of 
collapse.  The  Obama  Administration  is  moving  towards  a  social  democratic 
solution,  in  which  government  acts  as  the  ultimate  guarantor  of  access  to 
affordable health care. It remains to be seen whether Obama will be successful 
in overcoming the powerful lobbies opposed to reform, but the inevitability of a 
social democratic solution is widely accepted.
As  with  health,  education  is  both  the  subject  and  source  of  risk  concerning 
lifetime outcomes. On the one hand, as children start school, or as teenagers 
enter university, there is a lot of uncertainty about the outcomes. Some will do 
well  and  go  on  to  highly  paid  jobs,  while  others  will  do  poorly  and  face  the 
prospect  of  insecure,  badly  paid  work.  But  this  uncertainty  is  not  uniform. 
Students from wealthy backgrounds with highly educated parents face better 
odds than those whose parents have low incomes and less education. 
As a result, any system relying primarily on private financing and provision of 
education  is  likely  to  be  inefficient  and  inequitable.  Students  from  poor 
backgrounds will have limited access to loans to support education, and will face 
less favourable borrowing terms and more limited opportunities. 6
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As  with  health  care,  the  financial  crisis  has  resulted  in  the  near-collapse  of 
many of the quasi-market solutions adopted in the United States such as loan 
schemes for college tuition.
 Reframing inequality in the context of risk
The  issue  of  the  distribution  and  redistribution  of  income  has  long  been  a 
central concern of democratic political systems. In the 20th century, particularly 
on the Left, the issue of income distribution was viewed primarily in terms of 
economic and social class, usually with a focus on the organised working class. 
As  class  boundaries  have  blurred  and  unions  have  declined  in  power  and 
influence,  the  effectiveness  of  class-based  arguments  for  redistribution  have 
declined. 
People’s lifetime incomes are inevitably affected by their family backgrounds. 
Children  from  dysfunctional  families  face  greater  risks  of  unemployment, 
poverty and so on than those from stable, socially integrated families. 
There is no inevitability about this relationship. People from poor and unstable 
family backgrounds can prosper, and those with a more favourable start in life 
may fail. From a risk perspective, however, the fact that everyone has a chance   
to do well does not alter the fundamental injustice of a society where people face 
radically different life chances. 
The problem of unequal life chances has commonly been framed in terms of a 
contrast  between  equality  of  opportunity  and  equality  of  outcome.  In  this 
framing,  equality of opportunity is the idea that everyone should have an equal 
chance  at  the  prizes  society  has  to  offer,  regardless  of  family  background. 
Equality of opportunity is distinguished from equality of outcome, that is, the 
idea that society should not be divided into groups of winners and losers, even if 
the contest for those positions is in some sense fair.7
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In reality, though, no such distinction is sustainable in the long run. Without 
active intervention, inequality is cumulative over time. In a society with highly 
unequal outcomes, those who do well in an initially equal race will have the 
resources  to  ensure  a  head  start  for  their  children,  in  the  form  of  private 
schooling,  capital  for  business  investment,  richer  social  networks  and  so  on. 
Hence, equal opportunity cannot be sustained for long in the presence of highly 
unequal outcomes. 
This  point  is  illustrated  by  the  experience  of  the  United  States.  In  the  19th 
century the United States genuinely was a land of opportunity, with rates of 
social  mobility  far  greater  than  those  in  Europe.  By  the  late  20th  century, 
Americans born into low income families were less likely to escape poverty than 
their counterparts in other developed countries (Goodin et al. 1999).
The Great Risk Shift
In the last quarter of the 20th century, there was a reaction against the 
welfare  state,  and  an  associated  increase  in  risk  and  insecurity,  driven  by 
economic liberalism. Economic liberals criticised the welfare state as a costly, 
inefficient  and  ultimately  inequitable  drag  on  economic  performance.  One 
influential way of framing this critique was the claim that by socialising the 
risks faced by individuals and households, the welfare state necessarily reduced 
incentives to pursue risky opportunities. Hence, it was argued that reductions 
in  welfare  benefits  would  reduce  welfare  dependence  and  create  a  more 
enterprising society. 
Economic  liberalism  affected  not  only  the  explicit  institutions  of  the 
welfare state like social welfare benefits, but also the implicit contracts between 
workers and employers, under which employers would seek to preserve jobs, 
except in circumstances where the viability of their business was threatened, 
and to reward the loyalty of long-term employees through the maintenance of 
career  paths.  From  the  1980s  onwards,  businesses  routinely  dismissed 8
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employees in large numbers, not as a last resort, but as a preferred method of 
making already substantial profits even larger.
With the advantage of hindsight, it is evident that the transfer of risk 
from  government  and  business  to  workers  and  households  was  the  most 
significant outcome of the era of capitalism, dominated by the global financial 
sector, that now appears to be approaching its end. Hacker (2006) describes this 
transfer as the ‘Great Risk Shift’. 
The way forward
The analysis above provides a framework in which the broad outlines of policy 
responses to the financial crisis, and its likely aftermath can be developed.
2. Expenditure, taxes and fiscal policy
Fiscal policy (taxing and spending) is the central business of government.  There 
are  two  main  issues  in  fiscal  policy.  The  first  concerns  the  macroeconomic 
effects  of  changes  in  the  budget  balance.  The  second  concerns  the  scale  and 
scope  of  public  expenditure  and  the  taxation  system  needed  to  finance  such 
expenditure.
Under  the  Keynesian  system  of  macroeconomic  management  dominant  from 
World War II to the early 1970s, active fiscal policy was used to manage the 
economy. In periods of weak demand, temporary budget deficits associated with 
measures such as increased public expenditure, transfer payments or tax cuts 
were used to stimulate the economy. Conversely, in periods of strong demand, 
taxes were increased and public expenditure cut to reduce inflationary pressure.
During  the  era  of  economic  liberalism,  monetary  policy  based  on  inflation 
targeting was the primary tool of macroeconomic management. But monetary 
policy has proved largely ineffectual in response to the global financial crisis. 
Even after US interest rates were reduced to zero, the downturn in the economy 
continued and even accelerated. 9
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As in Japan during the 1990s, the situation is most appropriately analysed as a 
Keynesian liquidity trap, where reductions in interest rates have no effect. In 
such  a  situation,  monetary  policy  must  be  replaced  by  expansionary  fiscal 
policy. Even in Australia, where some scope for expansionary monetary policy 
remains, two rounds of fiscal stimulus have been implemented and more will 
almost certainly be required.
Active fiscal policy is not simply an emergency measure. It is likely to play an 
important role into the future. Stimulatory policies entailing temporary deficits 
should  be  combined  with  measures  designed  to  ensure  the  sustainability  of 
fiscal policy. Broadly speaking, such measures must provide for medium term 
balance  between  revenues  and  current  expenditures,  and  for  capital 
expenditure policies that generate growth of public sector assets, debts and net 
worth broadly in line with national income.
By the time a global recovery is firmly established, the net worth of the public 
sector will have declined substantially as a result of a series of  budget deficits.   
Deficits arise automatically during recessions as a result of lower tax revenue 
and higher payments for unemployment and other social welfare benefits. In 
addition to these automatic effects, substantial fiscal stimulus in the form of 
increased public expenditure and temporary cash transfers will be required to 
soften the impact of the crisis.
To service, and gradually reduce, increased public debt it is necessary for the 
government to plan for budget surpluses in the post-recession period. Some of 
the shift towards surplus may be achieved through reductions in spending on 
programs  designed  to  provide  a  fiscal  stimulus,  or  to  maintain  employment 
levels in a declining economy. However, given a sustained increase in the risk 
aversion  of  private  investors,  a  similarly  sustained  increase  in  the  scope  of 
government  activity  is  likely  to  be  necessary.  It  follows  that  the  necessary 10
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surpluses  can  only  be  produced  by  an  increase  in  government  revenue  as  a 
share of national income.
Even  more  important  in  the  long  run  will  be  the  need  to  determine  an 
appropriate balance between the public and private sectors. The crucial social 
democratic idea here is that of the mixed economy, based on the observation 
that  neither  public  nor  private  provision  of  goods  and  services  is  uniformly 
superior. 
The theoretical program of economic liberalism is based on a claim (made in 
stronger or weaker forms as the rhetorical and political demands of the occasion 
demanded)  that  markets  outperform  governments  in  all  but  a  handful  of 
economic activities, and that the reduction of the public sector to a ‘minimal 
state’ is economically desirable. The resulting policy program for the last thirty 
years has been an attempt to roll back the growth of the state, both in terms of 
the  range  of  activities  undertaken  and  of  the  share  in  national  income  of 
taxation and government expenditure. 
The drive to contract the range of activities undertaken by the state has had 
some  limited  successes,  notably  in  relation  to  the  privatisation  of  public 
enterprises, but has generally failed with respect to core welfare state activities 
such  as  health  and  education.  As  regards  the  size  of  government  relative  to 
national  income,  the  strenuous  efforts  of  economic  liberals  have  been 
counterbalanced by the growth in demand for publicly provided services, with 
the  result  that  the  share  of  government  in  national  income  has  remained 
broadly stable since the 1970s.
The failure of economic liberalism and the global financial crisis has created a 




First,  it  is  likely  that  weak  labour  market  conditions  will  continue  for  some 
years to come. This will necessitate continued direct employment creation in the 
public sector, particularly in the labour-intensive community services sector.
Second, as discussed below, the idea of delivering public services through public-
private partnerships appears to be dead, at least for the foreseeable future, and 
in  its  current  form.  This  will  entail  acceptance  by  governments  of 
responsibilities they have sought to outsource to the private sector.
Third, the end of easy credit means that the structure of demand is likely to 
change, away from debt-financed consumer durables and housing and towards 
services.  Given  the  central  role  of  the  public  sector  in  providing  a  range  of 
services, this must imply an increase in the relative demand for public sector 
outputs.
Finally, the risk premium associated with private investment is likely to remain 
high  for  years  to  come.  This  necessitates  a  reversal  in  the  decline  of  public 
investment  over  recent  decades.  In  this  context,  public  investment  must  be 
taken  to  include  investment  in  human  capital  (health  and  education)  and 
natural  capital  (preservation  of  environmental  assets)  as  well  as  physical 
capital such as infrastructure investments.
Some  of  these  needs  have  been  apparent  for  some  years,  while  others  have 
become more urgent as a result of the financial crisis. Until recently, debate on 
topics of this kind was stymied by the apparent impossibility of raising taxes 
explicitly, or of raising the share of national income collected as tax revenue.
The ‘tax revolt’ of the 1970s engendered in politicians a seemingly permanent 
fear  of  raising  taxes.  The  Hawke–Keating  Labor  government’s  Trilogy 
commitments of 1984 included a promise not to increase the tax share of GDP, 
and similar commitments have been made by the Rudd government.12
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Even  after  the  tax  revolt  was  replaced  by  a  public  preference  for  improved 
services, financial markets demanded restraint in the size of government, and 
pushed  for  the  privatisation  of  public  enterprises,  a  policy  which,  not 
coincidentally, generated massive flows of fee income for the financial sector.
In  addition,  the  globalisation  of  financial  markets  and  markets  for  skilled 
labour  encouraged international tax competition. Countries such as Ireland and 
the  Baltic  States  sought  to  attract  investment  with  low  corporate  tax  rates. 
Marginal rates of tax on high income earners were cut almost everywhere.
Finally,  international  tax  avoidance  and  evasion  flourished  in  the  late  20th 
century,  as  countries  from  Switzerland  and  Liechtenstein  to  the  Cayman 
Islands and banks such as UBS and Stanford International offered their clients 
a range of ‘wealth management’ services. 
Fortunately, many of the obstacles to an increase in taxation revenue have been 
removed as a result of the failure of economic liberalism. The anti-government 
sentiment  that  drove  the  ‘tax  revolts’  of  the  1970s,  dissipated  slowly  over 
subsequent decades as the need for improved public services became steadily 
more apparent (Grant 2004). 
The  power  and  prestige  of  the  financial  sector  has  collapsed.  The  ratings 
agencies in particular have been discredited by their promiscuous allocation of 
AAA  ratings  to  innovative  private  securities  such  as  Collateralised  Deposit 
Obligations  (CDOs).  Thousands  of  these  securities,  presented  as  being 
investments  as  safe  as  US  or  Australian  government  bonds,  have  gone  into 
default, with bondholders receiving little or nothing. Meanwhile, the banks, as 
massive  recipients  of  government  aid,  are  in  no  position  to  object  to  higher 
government spending (though that has not stopped some of them).
Further although no country has escaped the global financial crisis, countries 
that  have  relied  heavily  on  attracting  inflows  of  capital  and  skilled  labour 
through  low  tax  rates  have  fared  particularly  badly.  The  absence  of  a  well-13
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developed welfare state, an inevitable result of a low-tax policy, has produced 
massive  social  unrest  and  the  collapse  of  a  number  of  governments,  from 
Iceland  to  Latvia.  Workers  attracted  to  these  countries  have  been  returning 
home  in  large  numbers,  particularly  because  many  have  no  access  to  social 
security  systems  in  their  former  host  countries.  It  seems  unlikely  that 
competition from low-tax entrants to the global market will be problem in the 
near future.
Finally,  in  a  particularly  encouraging  development,  the  days  of  tax  havens 
appear  to  be  numbered.  The  EU  is  moving  to  end  all  bank  secrecy,  and  to 
demand co-operation from the leading European havens. Among the banks that 
have facilitated tax evasion, Stanford has been exposed as a Ponzi scheme
3 and 
UBS is facing a string of criminal and civil actions aimed at forcing it to expose 
tax-dodgers.  Wealthy  individuals  and  corporations  that  hope  to  hide  their 
money in a secret Swiss account, or in a Caribbean island, will have to think 
more carefully in future.
These  developments  mean  that  governments,  including  the  Australian 
government, face both the need, and the opportunity, to increase tax revenues 
substantially. To some extent, as discussed below, increases in revenue can be 
derived  from  the  income  generated  by  publicly  owned  assets.  However,  the 
majority of any increase in revenue must be raised through higher taxation. 
The two main sources of tax revenue are sales taxes (primarily the GST) and 
taxes on personal and corporate income. The obstacles to an increase in the GST 
rate of 10 per cent are formidable. The agreement under which the GST was 
introduced  requires  all  states  to  agree  to  any  change  in  the  rate.  The 
Commonwealth  Parliament  could  amend  the  legislation  to  remove  this 
requirement,  effectively  repudiating  the  agreement,  but  the  likelihood  of 
securing a Senate majority for such a course of action appears minimal. Hence, 




the primary focus for increasing tax revenue must be on personal and corporate 
income taxes. 
Although  Australia  has  avoided  the  massive  increases  in  inequality  seen  in 
other  English  speaking  countries,  the  era  of  economic  liberalism  has  been 
characterised by a sharp increase in the share of income going to the the richest 
members  of  the  community,  those  in  the  top  1  per  cent  of  the  income 
distribution. Their share of total income almost doubled between 1980 and 2000 
(Atkinson  and  Leigh  2007),  from  4.8  per  cent  to  8.8  per  cent  and  increased 
further in the final years of the bubble economy.
The financial crisis has affected some high income earners, particularly those 
employed  in  the  financial  sector,  or  whose  wealth  was  invested  in  the 
sharemarket.   However, this has not been enough to offset years of growing 
inequality,  especially  as  households in  the  middle  and  lower quintiles of  the 
income  distribution  have  also  been  affected  by  the  decline  in  the  value  of 
superannuation assets.
Changes  in  the  distribution  of  market  income  over  recent  decades  were 
amplified by changes in tax policy, including the abolition of the top marginal 
tax rate of 66 per cent, the introduction of dividend imputation, the halving of 
capital  gains  tax,  the  abandonment  of  measures  to  reduce  tax  avoidance 
through  trusts  and  companies,  and  the  flattening  of  tax  scales  under  the 
Howard  government.  All  of  these  measures  disproportionately  benefitted  the 
rich.
The  Rudd  government  has  taken  an  important  first  step  in  dropping  the 
‘aspiration’ to scrap the top marginal rate of taxation by 2013-14.
Restoration of stable and sustainable levels of public assets, debts and income   
will  require  considerably  more  painful  steps.  Given  the  collapse  of  forward 
estimates of government revenue, maintaining fiscal sustainability requires the 
abandonment  of  the  second  stage  of  the  tax  cuts  proposed  by  the  Howard 15
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government,  and  copied  by  Rudd  Labor  during  the  2007  election  campaign. 
Even at the time, these promises were irresponsible, since they took no account 
of possible adverse shocks. Now that the shocks have turned out worse than 
anything contemplated in forecasts at the time, the tax cuts must be abandoned. 
They should be replaced with temporary cuts in taxes and increases in once-off 
transfers, directed at those in the lower half of the income distribution.
Even at the time they were first promised, the tax cuts were bad policy and 
many economists called on the Rudd government to abandon them in its first 
budget.  The decision to implement the first stage of the tax cuts was, however,   
justified, since the alternative would have been to accelerate the corrosion of 
faith in government processes associated with a pattern of continuing promises. 
At that point, nothing had changed since the election to justify repudiating a 
promise. 
Now, however, everything has changed. Yet despite the disappearance of the 
projected surpluses that were expected to pay for the the tax cuts, and of any 
possible economic rationale for aiding high income earners, the government is 
still promising to proceed with the tax cuts promised in the utterly different 
world of 2007. If fiscal policy is to be sustainable, permanent tax cuts must be 
off the agenda for the foreseeable future. The surpluses out of which the tax cuts 
were  to  be  paid  have  vanished.  A  substantial  part  of  the  tax  cut  was 
compensation for anticipated bracket creep, on the basis of anticipated inflation 
that is no longer likely to occur.
In real terms, the tax cuts are larger, and more unaffordable, than when they 
were promised, even as the real capacity of the government to finance any tax 
cut has diminished. To keep this promise, the government will have to break 
many others, abandoning core commitments like the ‘Education Revolution’.
The  tax  cuts  proposed  by  the  Howard  government,  and  copied  by  the  Labor     
opposition  during  the  2007  campaign  were  permanent  and  were  targeted 16
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towards those in the top half of the income distribution.
4 The proposed tax cuts 
for July 2009 offer a paltry $3 a week to anyone with an income under $80 000, 
and nothing at all for those under $34 000. The biggest proportional benefit 
accrues at individual incomes of $180 000 a year. Such regressive tax cuts will 
do little good in the short run, either to boost consumption, or to repair the 
balance sheets of middle and lower-income households.
A Keynesian tax cut should be temporary and targeted at those below median 
incomes, who are mostly likely to spend it, and, if they save it, most likely to 
need the money to balance their household budgets. The “temporary” aspect of 
the stimulus is crucial. Once the financial crisis is over, higher taxes will be 
needed  for  a  long  time,  both  to  service  and  repay  debt  and  to  finance  the 
permanently larger role for government inevitable in the light of the collapse of 
the financial sector. Having reaped most of the benefits of the era of economic 
liberalism,  it  is  appropriate  that  those  in  the  top  10  per  cent  of  the  income 
distribution,  and  particularly  those  in  the  top  1  per  cent,  should  make  the 
largest proportional contribution.
The extent to which tax revenue needs to be increased will depend on a wide 
range of factors, including the level of public debt needed to finance economic 
stimulus  and  infrastructure  programs.  It  seems  likely  that  additional  public 
debt of 20 to 30 per cent of national income will be incurred.  Taking account of 
the need to service and pay down this debt, and to finance a sustained increase 
in  public  expenditure,  it  seems  likely  that  the  tax  share  of  national  income 
would need to rise by around 5 percentage points, or from 30 to 35 per cent. This 
would still leave Australia a relatively low-tax country, especially as tax rates 
can be expected to rise globally.
4  Under  the  conventions  of  Australian  politics,  this  group  is  normally  referred  to  as  “middle-income 
earners”, but this is no time for polite fictions.17
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3. Financial sector regulation
Radical  changes  in  financial  sector  regulation  have  already  taken  place  in 
Australia and elsewhere as a result of the financial crisis. Guarantees of bank 
deposits  have  been  introduced  or  greatly  expanded  in  all  major  economies. 
Partial  or  complete  nationalisation  of  failing  institutions,  with  the  resulting 
assumption of risk by the public, has been widespread.
However, these policies have been introduced as emergency measures, with the 
implicit (and sometimes explicit) premise that they will be ended when normal 
(pre-crisis) conditions are restored. This premise is untenable. By the time the 
crisis is over, the financial sector will be radically transformed, and will require 
a radically different mode of regulation.
The  starting  point  for  a  stable  regulatory  regime  must  be  a  reversal  of  the 
burden of proof in relation to financial innovation. The prevailing rule has been 
to allow, and indeed encourage, financial innovations unless they can be shown 
to represent a threat to financial stability. Given an unlimited public guarantee 
for the liabilities of these institutions such a rule is a guaranteed, and proven, 
recipe for disaster, offering huge rewards to any innovation that increases both 
risks (ultimately borne by the public) and returns (captured by the innovators).
Post-crisis  financial  regulation  must  begin  with  a  clearly  defined  set  of 
institutions  (such  as  banks  and  insurance  companies)  offering  a  set  of  well-
tested financial instruments with explicit public guarantees for clients, and a 
public  guarantee  of  solvency,  with  nationalisation  as  a  last-resort  option. 
Financial innovations must be treated with caution, and allowed only on the 
basis of a clear understanding of their effects on systemic risk.
In  this  context,  it  is  crucial  to  maintain  sharp  boundaries  between  publicly 
guaranteed  institutions  and  unprotected  financial  institutions  such  as  hedge 
funds, finance companies, stockbroking firms and mutual funds. Institutions in 
the latter category must not be allowed to present a threat of systemic failure 18
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that might precipitate a public sector rescue, whether direct (as in the recent 
crisis) or indirect (as in the 1998 bailout of Long Term Capital Management). A 
number of measures are required to ensure this.
First, ownership links between protected and unprotected financial institutions 
must be absolutely prohibited, to avoid the risk that failure of an unregulated 
subsidiary will necessitate a rescue of the parent, or that an unregulated parent 
could seek to expose a bank subsidiary to excessive risk. Long before the current 
crisis, these dangers were illustrated by Australian experience with bank-owned 
finance companies, most notably the rescue, by the Reserve Bank, of the Bank 
of Adelaide in the 1970s.
Second, banks should not market unregulated financial products such as share 
investments and hedge funds.
Third, the provision of bank credit to unregulated financial enterprises should 
be  limited  to  levels  that  ensure  that  even  large-scale  failure  in  this  sector 
cannot threaten the solvency of the regulated system.
In the resulting system of ‘narrow banking’, the financial sector would become, 
in effect, an infrastructure service, like electricity or telecommunications. While 
the  provision  of  financial  services  might  be  undertaken  by  either  public  or 
private  enterprises,  governments  would  accept  a  clear  responsibility  for  the 
stability of the financial infrastructure.
Global financial architecture
One  of  the  most  striking  developments  of  the  late  20th  century  was  the 
explosion  in  the  volume,  speed  and  complexity  of  international  financial 
transactions, and the resulting breakdown of effective regulatory control over 
the global financial system. The speed with which this process has gone into 
reverse since the onset of the financial crisis has been equally striking.19
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Transactions in the global foreign exchange market, once confined to financing 
trade flows, peaked at around $4 trillion per day in mid-2008. At that pace, two 
days of foreign exchange trading would be sufficient to finance an entire year’s 
trade flows.   The growth of private credit reached an annualised rate of $10 
trillion at the same time. 
Since  then  the  market  has  collapsed.  Although  data  on  foreign  exchange 
markets  is  slow  to  arrive,  it  seems  clear  that  volumes  and  liquidity  have 
declined sharply.
According  to  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (2009),  private  sector  credit 
growth has fallen 90 per cent, and ‘Emerging bond markets virtually shut down 
for a period of time in the fourth quarter’ . 
Although rescue measures by governments have restored some credit flows, the 
long term tendency is towards reversal of financial globalisation.   Banks that 
have  been  bailed  out  or  nationalised  are  being  encouraged,  and  sometimes 
forced, to sell off overseas assets and focus on their home market. Public policy 
is simply reinforcing the pressures of the market.
In  one  of  many  similar  examples,  the  Rudd  government  has  been  forced  to 
intervene in the market for motor vehicle finance and, on a larger scale, in the 
commercial property finance market, in response to the withdrawal of foreign 
lenders from the market.
By the time financial markets have been stabilised, the global financial system 
that prevailed a year ago will have contracted rapidly, with many markets and 
institutions  disappearing  altogether.  The  challenge  facing  governments  and 
regulators will be to construct a new global financial system and a regulatory 
architecture strong enough to prevent a recurrence of the bubble and meltdown 
that has largely destroyed the existing unregulated system.20
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The first objective must be to ensure that exchange rate movements reflect the 
economic fundamentals of trade and long-term capital flows, rather than the 
vicissitudes of financial markets.   The most promising candidate here is the 
idea, long-advocated and long-resisted, of a small tax on financial transactions, 
commonly called a Tobin tax. The idea was first put forward by James Tobin 
(1978), and discussed further in a volume edited by ul Haq, Kaul and Grunberg 
(1996).
A  tax  at  a  rate  of  0.1  per  cent  would  be  insignificant  in  relation  to  the 
transactions costs associated with international trade or long-term investments. 
On the other hand, daily transactions of $3 trillion would yield revenue of $30 
billion per day, or nearly $1 trillion per year. Since this amount exceeds the 
total profits of the financial sector (profits that are likely to be much smaller in 
future) an effective Tobin tax would imply a drastic reduction in the volume of 
short-term financial flows. It follows that the revenue from a Tobin tax, while 
significant,  would  not  be  sufficient  to  replace  the  main  existing  sources  of 
taxation, such as income tax.
The  large  literature  on  Tobin  taxes  has  identified  some  problems  with  the 
simple  proposal  for  a  tax  on  international  financial  transactions.  First,  it  is 
possible  to  replicate  spot  transactions  on  foreign  exchange  markets  with 
combinations of forward, futures and swap transactions. To make a Tobin tax 
effective,  it  would  have  to  be  applied  to  all  financial  transactions,  including 
domestic transactions. During the bubble era, when the few remaining taxes on 
domestic financial transactions were being scrapped to facilitate the growth of 
the financial sector, this was seen as a fatal objection. It has become apparent, 
however,  that  the  destabilising  effects  of  explosive  growth  in  the  volume  of 




The  fact  that  a  Tobin  tax  on  international  financial  transactions  would  be 
integrated with taxes on domestic transactions suggests that, in all probability, 
revenue  would  be  collected  and  retained  by  national  governments.  However, 
suggestions  that  at  least  some  of  the  revenue  could  be  used  to  fund  global 
projects  such  as  the  international  development  goals  of  UNCTAD  remains 
worthy of consideration.
The  second  problem  is  that  the  tax  would  require  global  co-operation,  since 
otherwise financial market activity would migrate to jurisdictions that did not 
apply the tax. Although this will remain a problem in the post-crisis world, it is 
likely to be much less severe than indicated by earlier discussions. The number 
of  separate  jurisdictions  that  would  need  to  agree  has  been  substantially 
diminished by the emergence of the euro. 
As part of the resolution of the crisis, it seems inevitable that most remaining 
European  currencies,  with  the  possible  exception  of  the  British  pound,  will 
disappear, and that a Europe-wide regulatory system will emerge.  The number 
of  separate  jurisdictions  with  well-developed  financial  systems  is  therefore 
likely  to  be  very  small,  with  the  European  Union,  United  States  and  Japan 
being overwhelmingly dominant.
As in the case of tax evasion, the problem of ‘offshore’ financial centres, such as 
Caribbean island states, is unlikely to be a serious stumbling block. The free 
market dogmas that prevented effective action to preserve the effectiveness of 
financial regulation in the late 20th century have lost much of their force. A 
Tobin  tax  on  transactions  among  complying  jurisdictions  may  have  to  be 
supplemented by a punitive tax, at a rate of, say 10 per cent, on transactions 
with  non-compliant  jurisdictions.  This  would  effectively  ensure  that  non-
compliant jurisdictions were excluded from global financial markets, though the 
penalty would be modest as regards trade and long-term investment flows.22
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Another  important  regulatory  adjustment  will  be  the  end  of  the  system  by 
which prudential regulation has been, in effect, outsourced to ratings agencies 
such as Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. Agency ratings have been enshrined in 
regulation,  for  example  through  official  investment  guidelines  that  require 
regulated entities to invest in assets with a high rating (AAA in some cases, 
investment  grade  in  others)  or  provide  those  responsible  for  making  bad 
investment decisions with a ‘safe harbour’ against claims of negligence if the 
assets  in  question  carried  a  high  rating.  For  these  purposes  at  least,  an 
international,  publicly-backed  non-profit  system  of  assessing  and  rating 
investments is required.
It is to early to determine the form a new global financial architecture will take. 
Much  depends  on  the  extent  to  which  existing  financial  institutions  are 
transformed  by  the  crisis.  However,  it  is  possible  to  draw  one  fundamental 
conclusion from the crisis. From the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of 
fixed exchange rates
5 to the present, domestic financial regulation has operated 
subject to the constraints imposed by unregulated global financial markets. This 
balance  must  be  reversed.  Global  financial  markets  must  be  controlled  and 
regulated so that they do not threaten the integrity of domestic regulation.
4. Human services and employment
The provision of human services such as health, education and social services 
has always played a central role in social democratic policies. Even at the height 
of  economic  liberalism,  when  public  enterprises  were  privatised  en  masse, 
assaults  on  core  social-democratic  institutions  such  as  Medicare  and  the 
Pharmaceutical  Benefits  Scheme  failed,  and  the  push  for  a  market-driven 
approach to education met vigorous resistance. The resilience of these and other 
5  The ‘Bretton Woods’ system is named after the location of a conference held in 1944 to plan 
the reconstruction of the global economic system after World War II. The conference established 
the  World  Bank  and  International  Monetary  Fund  and  introduced  measures  to  remove  or 




components of the social-democratic welfare state was the main reason for the 
failure of free-market ‘reforms’ to reverse the growth in the share of national 
income allocated to public expenditure.
Human  services  are  central  to  the  social  democratic  vision  for  a  number  of 
reasons. First, as already noted, the universal provision of these services  is at 
least as important as direct income redistribution in ameliorating the risks and 
inequalities inherent in a capitalist society. Second, market provision of these 
services has repeatedly proved inadequate and unsatisfactory. Finally, public 
funding and provision of human services is an expression of social solidarity 
against the atomism and self-seeking that is at the core of economic liberalism.
The provision of human services will be even more important in the wake of the 
financial crisis. The growth of the sector has been constrained by the dominance 
of  small-government  ideology,  resulting  in  a  substantial  imbalance  between 
private  consumption  and  human  services.  Most  Australians  say  they  would 
prefer  improved  services  to  tax  cuts,  but  governments  of  both  parties  have 
offered tax cuts anyway. 
Equally importantly, labour demand from the private sector is declining fast as 
a result of the crisis and is likely to remain weak for years to come. The finance 
and business services sector, a major employer of skilled workers, is likely to 
contract permanently.   The human services sector is among the most labour-
intensive areas of the economy. Expanding provision of these services will make 
a major contribution to the restoration of full employment.
The limited responses announced by the Rudd government so far will not be 
adequate to respond to the current crisis. Consideration of active labour market 
measures aimed  at  minimising the  impact  of  any  economic contraction must 
begin now if growth in long-term unemployment is to be avoided.24
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There  are  three  main  classes  of  active  labour  market  policy:  training,  wage 
subsidies and direct job creation. The choice between them depends, in part, on 
timing.
Most of the time, training is the best way of making people more employable. To 
some extent this is also true when a recession or slowdown is looming. If the 
labour  market  is  weak,  the  option  of  staying  in  school,  or  of  going  back  to 
university or TAFE to enhance your qualifications is more attractive. It is safe 
to predict that demand for tertiary education places is going to be higher for the 
next year or more. The need for the promised education revolution has never 
been greater.
On  the  other  hand,  training  programs  directed  at  those  who  are  already 
unemployed are of little use in recessions. When few employers are hiring, those 
who  do  so  can  pick  and  choose  from  a  pool  of  experienced  and  qualified 
candidates.  A  training  course  of  a  few  months,  the  kind  of  thing  usually 
associated with active labour market policy, is unlikely to move an unemployed 
person to the front of the queue.
The choice between wage subsidies for hiring unemployed workers and direct 
job creation is more complex. Job creation gets a bad name from silly projects 
exemplified  by  the  (apparently  apocryphal)  case  of  ‘painting  rocks  white’,  so 
they  tend  to  be  a  last  resort.  But  the  alternative  of  wage  subsidies  is  least 
effective during the initial contraction phase of a recession, when employers are 
cutting back or freezing their staff numbers.
It is precisely at this time when some well-timed projects could do a lot of good. 
In this respect the assistance to local governments incorporated in the stimulus 
package looks like a good idea.
Finally, while there are good reasons for governments to pick up the private 
sector slack as regards infrastructure investment, it’s important to remember 
that the days of large gangs of workers swinging picks and shovels are long 25
26
27
gone. Physical infrastructure projects have many potential merits, but large-
scale job creation is not among them.
5. Infrastructure
For much of the last decade, infrastructure policies have focused on the idea of 
public–private  partnerships,  in  the  specific  form  referred  to  by  the  acronym 
PPP.  The  term  ‘PPP’  is  misleading,  since,  just  about  any  form  of  economic 
activity  involves  both  public  sector  and  private  sector  contributions  of  some 
kind. The public sector contributes the basic legal and property rights structure 
within which all private sector activity takes place and much of the physical 
infrastructure  on  which  economic  activity  depends.  The  private  sector 
contributes a vast range of goods and services necessary to any kind of economic 
activity, public or private. The question is not whether to engage in partnership 
but what form that partnership should take.
In  the  standard  PPP  model,  assets  are  owned  by  private  consortia,  the 
profitability of which depend on high levels of debt. This model is no longer 
viable and the flow of new PPP projects has ceased since the crisis began. The 
end of the PPP model that has prevailed for the last decade does not, however, 
mean the end of partnerships between the public and private sector.
The experience of the PPP era suggests that the optimal arrangement for most 
public projects will involve private sector firms tendering for construction at a 
fixed price, with transfer of ownership to the public sector on completion. The 
contract may also involve maintenance for a fixed period after completion to 
ensure high quality of construction work.   The operational activities of public 
sector assets such as schools and hospitals should be under public control, but 
many inputs will be provided by private sector enterprises through contracts, 
tenders or market purchases.
One  common,  though  rarely  acknowledged,  motivation  for  the  use  of  a  PPP 
project has been the desire of governments to avoid levying user charges for 26
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public infrastructure assets such as roads. The spurious transfer of ownership 
to a private firm has made it possible to conceal the reality that governments 
are in fact levying such charges.
In  the  post-crisis  environment,  such  evasions  will  no  longer  be  possible. 
Governments will need to increase revenue substantially to meet the costs of 
their expanded role, and to service the debt associated with the large deficits 
and capital expenditures required to resolve the crisis. In these circumstances, 
it will be necessary to apply user charges for public assets such as roads. The 
required charges should reflect the social cost of road congestion, and the need 
for  a  continuing  return  on  capital  assets,  and  should  not  be  related  to  the 
construction costs of recent additions to the road network. 
Similarly,  governments  should  seek  to  earn  socially  appropriate  returns  to 
public  investments  in  network  infrastructure  assets  such  as  electricity  and 
telecommunications networks, ports and so on. The large scale privatisation of 
such  assets  is  likely  to  be  reversed  in  coming  years  as  heavily  geared  asset 
owners default on their debts and private buyers are unwilling to invest except 
at fire-sale prices.
The  experience  of  the  PPP  era  shows  that  many  different  structures  for  the 
provision  of  goods  and  services,  ranging  from  private  corporations  to  direct 
government  provision  are  possible  and  may  be  appropriate  in  different 
situations.  Possible  alternatives  include  statutory  authorities,  government 
business  enterprises,  not-for-profit  corporations  and  a  range  of  structures 
combining public and private contributions.
6. What’s left of economic liberalism ?
The decade of financial crises that began in the late 1990s has demonstrated the 
falsity  of  many  of  the  assumptions  underlying  economic  liberalism,  and,  in 
particular, of claims about the microeconomic and macroeconomic superiority of 
free markets. Nevertheless economic liberals were correct in pointing out some 27
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of the policy mistakes made under the postwar social democratic settlement. It 
is  important  that  a  resurgent  social  democracy  should  avoid  repeating  those 
mistakes.
First,  the  experience  of  the  1970s  and  1980s  demonstrated  the  dangers  of 
chronic  budget  deficits.  However,  the  response  most  commonly  advocated  by 
economic liberals at the time, that of a requirement for budget balance on an 
annual  basis,  would  exacerbate  business  cycles  and  preclude  any  serious 
response to the current crisis.
Second, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the painful period of 
economic disruption that followed it gave a clear demonstration of the economic 
costs  of  inflation.  Attempts  in  the  1960s  to  exploit  a  trade-off  between 
unemployment  and  inflation,  accepting  higher  inflation  in  return  for  lower 
unemployment, proved unsuccessful. As workers, firms and households became 
use to high levels of inflation, reductions in unemployment proved temporary, 
but inflation was firmly embedded in the system. Only after long years of high 
unemployment and the severe recession of the early 1990s was low inflation 
restored.
Third, economic liberals extended the move towards freer trade in goods and 
services  that  began  with  the  Bretton  Woods  conference  in  1944,  and  the 
establishment  of  the  Global  Agreement  on  Trade  and  Tariffs.  With  some   
relatively  minor  exceptions  (such  as  attempts  to  undermine  environmental 
protections and trade union rights in the name of free trade) the growth in trade 
in  goods  and  services  has  been  overwhelmingly  beneficial,  unlike  the 
disproportionate expansion in financial flows. A new international settlement 
must encourage trade and ensure that global financial markets facilitate trade 
and investment, rather than destabilising them.
These lessons will be of particular importance when the economy emerges from 
the current crisis. They are important precisely because the crisis will generate 28
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both  large  and  sustained  budget  deficits  and  a  need  for  monetary  policies 
focused on fighting deflation rather than inflation. It is important to recognise 
that  while  budget  deficits  and  fiscal  expansion  are  necessary  responses  to 
severe economic downturns, governments should maintain budget balance over 
the course of the economic cycle and should aim at positive levels of net worth. 
Similarly, while modest rates of inflation may be beneficial in the short run, a 
long run target rate of 2 to 3 per cent remains desirable.
Concluding comments
In the face of a global crisis of their own making, the advocates of economic 
liberalism have had nothing to offer. Even with respect to the relatively narrow 
issue  of  salvaging  the  banking  system,  the  responses  have  ranged  from 
reluctant acquiescence in a range of rescue measures to vociferous opposition to 
‘bailouts’,  without  any  analysis  of  the  resulting  large-scale  financial 
bankruptcies or suggestions of possible responses. Consideration of the broader 
issues raised by the collapse of the economic order that has prevailed for the last 
thirty years has been almost non-existent.
It is therefore, up to social democrats to develop and guide both the response to 
the  immediate  crisis  and  the  reconstruction  of  a  social  and  economic  order 
sufficiently robust to avoid such crises in the future. This paper has raised a 
variety of suggestions in relation to economic policy.
The global financial crisis will have long-term effects going far beyond finance 
and economics. There is already a reaction against the consumption culture that 
has  become  steadily  more  extreme  over  recent  decades,  as  the  restraining 
influences of Depression-era frugality and the anti-materialist idealism of the 
1960s faded away. At this stage, the reaction is superficial and unlikely to be 
maintained in the event of a rapid return to pre-crisis conditions. But such a 
return is improbable. Even when economic growth and employment recover, the 29
30
31
effects of the crisis on wealth and debt levels, and on access to consumer credit 
are likely to persist for many years.
Going beyond specific policies, the failure of financial regulation leading up to 
the  crisis  is  likely  to  lead  to  a  re-evaluation  of  ‘light-handed’  and  ‘incentive-
based’ regulation in all areas of public policy.   Similarly, ideas such as New 
Public  Sector  Management,  promoted  largely  on  the  basis  of  the  supposed 
superiority of private sector methods, will need to be re-examined.
In  an  environment  as  uncertain  as  that  of  the  present,  any  attempt  at 
forecasting future developments and proposing responses is inevitably going to 
be erroneous in important respects. But the task must be attempted, and the 
broad outlines of a social-democratic response can already be discerned.
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